e Continuum of Intergroup Relations
Violent con ict and altruistic cooperation represent opposite ends of a continuum of intergroup relations with a midpoint of peaceful coexistence. Along this continuum intergroup relations are reciprocal. Deutsch's (1973) "law of social relationships" states that "characteristic processes and e ects elicited by a given type of social relationship (cooperative or competitive) tend also to elicit that type of social relationship" (p. 365). Sherif and Sherif (1979) claimed that interaction between groups "is determined by the reciprocal interests and the goals of the groups involved" (p. 10). A basic assumption made here is that intergroup relations are typically competitive though nonviolent, and that reciprocal violence and altruistic cooperation are atypical cases.
Reconciliation: Change in the Reciprocal Responses of Groups
To reconcile, groups must transition from reciprocal con ict to peaceful coexistence and mutual acceptance; in some rare cases reconciliation can lead to reciprocal trust and support for attainment of material and social reinforcement. Weaver and de Waal (2003) de ned reconciliation as "the exchange of friendly behavior between those involved in a ght (former opponents)" and view the phenomenon as an evolved social mechanism that maintains homeostatic autonomic arousal in individuals. Reconciliation has been observed in a number of primate species, including humans (de Waal, 2000) , and may occur at di erent levels of analysis: in dyads, within an intact group, and between groups. A well-developed literature on reconciliation among primates at the dyadic and intragroup levels exists (see Weaver & de Waal, 2003) ; only recently has attention been directed to the intergroup context by social psychologists (e.g., Nadler & Laviatan, 2006) .
Intragroup Reconciliation
When individuals' outcomes are mutually dependent, for example within a marriage, a peer group, or a primate colony, reconciliation is essential to maintain the structural integrity of the unit, to reduce members' tension, and to maximize individuals' reinforcement. Within groups, high status members will di use others' con icts, those with a vested interest in the opponents will intervene, and third parties will mediate reconciliation (de Waal, 2000) .
Intergroup Reconciliation
Reconciliation processes have also been observed in the intergroup context (Judge & de Waal, 1994) , however this is much more complex than intragroup reconciliation because mutual dependency may be absent, or not perceived by the antagonists. In some cases groups have never had a cooperative relationship; historically their interactions have been characterized by status asymmetry, inequality, mistrust, dislike, or violence. Moreover, antagonists may not believe that mutual outcome dependency can be achieved or, because of intense hatred, may not wish to positively engage the enemy. ese are variables that moderate intergroup relations and set limits on reconciliation, which, like con ict, is a special case of intergroup relations. Reconciliation is a reciprocal phenomenon, unfolding over time characterized by a transition from con ict to peaceful coexistence, or possibly, cooperation. An assumption made here is that the "friendly behavior" witnessed in intragroup reconciliation may be an unrealistic short-term goal in most cases of intergroup reconciliation, especially when groups have a long history of acrimony and violence. Peaceful coexistence is likely a more realistic outcome in these cases. e basic questions for a social psychology of reconciliation are "what system of variables a ects reciprocal intergroup responses?" and "what variables a ect the transition from intergroup con ict to peaceful coexistence?" A theoretical analysis of intergroup relations and the implications for reconciliation follows. Also considered is a theoretical model of intergroup relations and two forms of reciprocity that are relevant to reconciliation.
Basic Constructs in Intergroup Relations
e science of intergroup relations is in its "infancy" (Brewer & Brown, 1998) , and no "adequate theory of intergroup relations" exists (Mackie & Smith, 1998 ). Yet, to understand reconciliation a conceptual model of intergroup relations is necessary so that the empirical agenda is guided by an integrated, general conceptual framework. Decades of work reveal four basic constructs that determine intergroup relations; they are ethnocentrism, stereotypes, a ect, and the perceived equality of opportunity for resource attainment. O en treated as separate research topics, the Intergroup Relations Model (IRM), elaborated later, is proposed to integrate these constructs and can explain a broad range of intergroup phenomena including reconciliation. Intergroup relations are conceptualized using Sherif's (1966) de nition: "Whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its members in terms of their group identi cation, we have an instance of intergroup behavior" (p. 12).
Ethnocentrism
Since Sumner's seminal analysis (1906) , social psychology has focused on intergroup attitudes (e.g., Austin & Worchel, 1979; Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Brewer & Brown, 1998; Brigham, 1971; Brown, 1986; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Mackie & Smith, 1998; Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004; Sherif & Sherif, 1979) . Brewer and Campbell's (1976) research on ethnocentrism among East African tribes revealed that groups "without exception, rate their in-group more favorably than it is rated by any other outgroup" (p. 143). Substantial data document in-group ethnocentrism (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Mullen & Hu, 1989; Sherif, Harvery, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961; Stephan, 1985) .
Because groups are contexts for social identity development (Brown, 2000; Tajfel, 1978 Tajfel, , 1982 Turner, 1987) , processes relevant to the personal self operate similarly in groups (Crocker & Park, 2004) . Individuals are motivated to view themselves, and have others view them, positively (Taylor & Brown, 1988) , and this is also true in the intergroup context (Turner, 1987) . Individually and collectively, people are naïve realists who assume the correctness, validity, and superiority of their worldviews (Pronin et al., 2004) while exaggerating perceived di erences between groups (Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995) that precludes appreciation of similarity and a common fate (Ross & Ward, 1996) . Ethnocentrism is most virulent among groups in immediate proximity (Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Mackie & Smith, 1998) because of competition for the same resources (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001) .
Stereotypes: Shared Social Consensus
Group membership is associated with a litany of de ning features (e.g., Allport, 1954; Brigham, 1971; Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996; Fiske, 1998; Hamilton, 1981; Katz & Braly, 1933) . Allport (1954) stated, "life becomes easier when the category is not di erentiated. To consider every member of a group as endowed with the same traits saves us the pain of dealing with them as individuals" (p. 169). Categorization of individuals into the "we" and "they" groups a ects perceived variability and covariability of members' traits. Restricted variability o en characterizes out-group judgments, whereas the variability of in-group members is acknowledged (e.g., Mullen & Hu, 1989) . Category stereotypes are e cient, and even necessary, for information processing. e expectation that all triangles have three sides is rational, however expectations are degenerative when perceived invariance is irrational (e.g., most Muslims are terrorist sympathizers).
Perceived Equality of Opportunity for Resource Attainment
Successful competition with other groups for material resources is one function served by group formation (Campbell, 1965; Heylighen & Campbell, 1995) , although groups also compete for social resources such as status, prestige, power, respect, and positive social identity (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001; Tajfel, 1982; Turner, 1987) . Groups compare their resource attainment to determine if, given equivalent e ort, reward is equitable (Festinger, 1954; Homans, 1974) . Even when competition is fair and resource attainment is equal, groups are inclined to perceive their "share" as inequitable (Brown, 1986 (Brown, , 1988 Pronin et al., 2004) , and such perceptions moderate intergroup processes (Brown, 1986; Dovidio et al., 2004; Fiske, 2004; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Pruitt, 1998) including reconciliation. Groups perceived as high status competitors are seen as cold, whereas groups that do not pose a competitive challenge are seen as warm (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) . When advantaged groups perceive competitive injustice, prejudice toward the disadvantaged may decrease (Dovidio et al., 2004) , or inequity may be justi ed (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001) .
Intragroup and Intergroup A ect
Group identi cation facilitates self-de nition (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1982) when membership is "emotionally signi cant" (Brewer & Brown, 1998) . e concepts of "we" and "us" activate positive a ect outside of awareness (Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990) ; likewise a ect is implicated in responses to an out-group. If an out-group threatens the security of the in-group (Fiske et al., 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 2000) , or challenges de ning features of that group's identity (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999) negative a ect is a consequence. When competing for social resources such as status, members take malicious pleasure (i.e., Schadenfreude) in the competition's defeat (Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003) . When competing for resources, intergroup relations "take on an emotional valence from the beginning, with its character being negative and competitive" (Blake & Mouton, 1979, p. 31) . When one is a member of a group, its outcomes determine the emotions experienced by a member, and intergroup emotions impact intergroup behaviors (Dijker, Koomen, van den Heuvel, & Frijida, 1996; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000) . When a group has high status (Blanz, Mummendey, & Otten, 1995; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992) , disproportionate resource accumulation (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001; Staub, 1996) , or superior power (Keltner et al., 2003) there is an inclination to experience negative emotion toward and move against an out-group.
A group that controls attainment of material (e.g., food, economic opportunity, safety) and social (positive identity, respect, trust) resources has greater social power than one lacking this control (Keltner et al., 2003) . Power asymmetry varies as a function of social construal (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001 ) and objective group characteristics (e.g., size, wealth, or weaponry). Whether power is arbitrary or objective, high social power is expected to produce positive a ect, attention to reward attainment, contempt for, and an undi erentiated view of groups with low power. Low social power will produce frustration, negative a ect, humiliation, mistrust, attention to threat, and di erentiation of the characteristics of the powerful because they control reinforcement (Keltner et al., 2003) . Studies of interactions of stigmatized and nonstigmatized persons (e.g., Miller & Malloy, 2003) , and persons with di erent status (e.g., Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Fiske, 1993; Guinote, Judd, & Brauer, 2002) provide con rming data. A ect appears to play a central role in intergroup relations functioning as a mediator between intergroup cognition and behavior.
Implications for Intergroup Reconciliation
e transition from con ict to peaceful coexistence must entail a change in reciprocal intergroup ethnocentrism, stereotypes, a ect, and ultimately behavior. When groups in con ict view one another as members of a superordinate category (e.g., humanity) ethnocentrism, negative stereotypes, and negative a ect should abate (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005) . Likewise, viewing one's antagonists inclusively a ects the standards of justice used to evaluate past and present actions toward them, and emotional responsibility for injustice perpetrated (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005) . However, ethnocentrism, negative stereotypes, and hatred will only change if power asymmetries are reduced so that di erent groups perceive an equal opportunity for material and social resource attainment. Optimally, resource attainment would be mutually dependent with antagonistic groups deriving positive outcomes that replace the costly price of con ict (de Waal, 2000) . Below the IRM is proposed to explain intergroup relations and specify the conditions that will promote reconciliation.
e Intergroup Relations Model
e Intergroup Relations Model (IRM) speci es cognitive and a ective processes that determine intergroup behavior and is presented as a latent variable model in Figure 15 .1. In the IRM the most proximate determinant of intergroup behavior is a ect that is itself determined jointly by ethnocentrism and stereotypes. is speci cation assumes further that ethnocentrism and stereotypes are correlated constructs. e cognition-a ect-behavior mediational model diagramed in Figure 15 .1 is presumed to be moderated by groups' equality of opportunity for resource (i.e., material and social) attainment. For example, Blacks and Hispanics in America living in adjacent neighborhoods compete, equally or unequally, for the same resources (e.g., jobs). America and al Qaeda seek to annihilate each other because each fears domination by the other, while America and Great Britain compete economically yet o er mutual support. Most generally, the basic moderator of IRM processes is the perceived equality of opportunity for procurement of material and social resources and is discussed in the next section.
e IRM is consistent with other models that specify intergroup emotion as the proximate cause of behavior (Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993) . e IRM also shares some similarities with Stephan and Stephan's (2000) integrated threat theory in which perceptions and negative contact a ect intergroup anxiety and threat that, in turn, a ect attitudes toward a group. e IRM is also consistent with the social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and selfcategorization (Turner, 1987) theories that postulate incorporation of the social identity as a facet of the individual, psychological self that is implicated in responses to both in-and out-groups. e IRM is also in uenced by the view that intergroup relations are fundamentally competitive (Campbell, 1965; Hardin, 1968; Heylighen & Campbell, 1995; Sherif, 1966) because of realistic con ict over material and social resources.
What di erentiates the IRM from other conceptualizations is the integration of basic constructs in a single explicit model, the speci cation of cognitive primacy (ethnocentrism and stereotypes) that impacts emotion and, in turn, behavior, and the claim that the mediational processes are moderated by the equality of opportunity for resource attainment. is moderator of the IRM is derived from theoretical work on power (Fiske, 1993; (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001 ), realistic con ict (Campbell, 1965) , and social stigma (Crocker & Major, 1989) . e processes of the IRM can also be moderated by strong in-group identi cation in cases of war, threat, and attack (McCauley, Worchel, Moghaddam, & Lee, 2004) , and by mutual intergroup outcome dependency (Preuscho , Wang, Filippo, & de Waal, 2002) .
Perceived Equality and Inequality of Opportunity for Resource Attainment
If members of two groups perceive an equal opportunity to attain material and social resources (Keltner et al., 2003) given an equivalent expenditure of e ort (Homans, 1974) , groups will respect, or simply tolerate each other's culture, stereotypes will be neutral to positive, and intergroup a ect will be neutral to positive. Intergroup behavior will be realistically competitive (Campbell, 1965; Stephan & Stephan, 2000) but nonaggressive. In cases when groups' reinforcements are mutually dependent (Preuscho , Wang, Filippo, & de Waal, 2002) , members of di erent groups need one another and know this; consequently this recognition will facilitate reconciliation. Group members may perceive that, relative to other groups, their opportunity for resource attainment is not equal given equivalent e ort. Pruitt (1998) said "an assessment of the outcomes achieved by one's group, organization, or nation appears to be the most important source of collective con ict" (p. 470). With an unfair advantage there will be mutual dislike, trust will be low, stereotypes will be negative, and responses will occur to gain control of resources for the in-group. e powerful group will feel anger toward the less powerful and will be inclined to "move against them" behaviorally (Mackie et al., 2000) o en by imposing social control such as enlarging the size of law enforcement (Jackson, 1989) . e less powerful group will challenge the social structure, and each group will evidence ethnocentrism. When a group procures an inequitable share of the resources, cultural and psychological processes operate to maintain the inequality (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001 ). e advantaged exaggerate group di erences, view the in-group as superior, and share negative out-group stereotypes. Discriminatory responses to the disadvantaged follow from dislike and contempt for their inferiority. e disadvantaged will experience stereotype threat, stigmatization, humiliation, mistrust, and reduced self-esteem (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998) . When the advantaged are a numerical majority, or in contexts where pernicious stereotypes are most salient, the disadvantaged will disengage (Osborne, 2004; Steele, 1997) . e transition to reconciliation is impossible under conditions of objective, or perceived, inequality because intergroup relations will evidence negative cognitive and a ective reciprocity that will preclude postcon ict peacemaking. An essential rst step in reconciliation is protection of the weak from the strong by neutral brokers acceptable to both factions, and subsequent intervention by trusted third parties (e.g., respected international leaders) to promote equality of opportunity and fairness. Ultimately, the structural change of social institutions must occur so that equality of opportunity is institutionalized. Optimally, adversaries' reinforcements should be mutually dependent. Only then can intergroup cognitive and a ective processes change and facilitate the transition from reciprocal con ict to reciprocal cooperation; that is, reconciliation.
e Componential Structure of Reciprocal Intergroup Relations
Intergroup processes are not unidirectional; rather, when entities (individuals, teams, nations) respond to one another these responses are reciprocal. Consequently, intergroup relations are dyadic and reciprocal, and the application of methods for analysis of the components of dyadic data can be implemented. One method, termed variance component analysis, originated in psychometrics (Cronbach, Gleser, Nanda, & Rajaratnam, 1972) and biometrics (Searle, Casella, & McCulloch, 1992) , was introduced to social psychology by Kenny (1994) . ese methods have proven useful in studies of a broad range of intergroup phenomena (Malloy & Albright, 2001 ; Malloy, Albright, DiazLoving, Dong, & Lee, 2004; Malloy, Albright, Kenny, Agatstein, & Winquist, 1997; Malloy, Barcelos, Arruda, DeRosa, & Fonseca, 2005; Miller & Malloy, 2003) . Because reconciliation is a change in reciprocal responses over time, variance component analysis is directly relevant because reciprocity at di erent levels of analysis, with distinct theoretical meaning, can be considered.
To elaborate the componential structure of intergroup relations imagine two groups, the Hat elds (H) and the McCoys (M), two feuding clans on the Kentucky and Virginia border in the late 19th century. McCoys, upset by an "unjust" court decision regarding ownership of a hog, ambushed Hat elds while hunting. e Hat elds retaliated and killed a McCoy. e theoretical structure of a response by a Hat eld to a McCoy is presented in Figure 15 .2.
eoretically, H's response to M is a function of: (a) the consistency of H's responses to members of out-groups in general (e.g., A, B, C, as well as M) called an actor e ect, (b) the consistency of responses elicited by M from members of out-groups (e.g., A, B, C, as well as H) called a partner e ect, and (c) by H's unique response to M called, a uniqueness e ect, a er controlling for actor and partner e ects. e reciprocal response of M to H has the same components.
ese three components of an intergroup response, termed actor, partner, and uniqueness, must be partitioned because each has a distinct psychological meaning; failure to partition these e ects con ates psychologically distinct intergroup phenomena.
Psychological Interpretation of the Variance Components in Intergroup Responses
Consider the reactions of groups A and Z to groups B, C, and D. Assume that members of A share a positive stereotype about groups B, C, and D and that members of Z share a negative stereotype about B, C, and D. In Table 15 .1 hypothetical data representing this pattern are presented. Such a pattern is termed an actor e ect and all of the variation in intergroup responses is between groups A and Z. Now consider the responses of B, C, and D to A and Z. Assume that B, C, and D hold similar positive stereotypes of A and similar negative where α a is the consistency of A's responses to multiple groups (actor e ect), β b is the consistency of B's e ect on responses elicited from other groups (partner e ect), and γ ab is A's unique response to B a er controlling for α a and β b . e constant μ is the average of intergroup responses, and ε is random error. e variances of the components (i.e., α, β, and γ) are computed yielding estimates that quantify the consistency of intergroup responses emitted (actor), elicited (partner), and uniquely made to speci c groups (uniqueness). e null hypothesis tested is that a variance component equals zero. e variances and covariances of the components, as well as the components' relationships with other variables, quantify a broad range of intergroup phenomena with generalized and dyadic reciprocity being centrally relevant to reconciliation.
In traditional Fisherian analysis, the mean response in one condition is compared to the mean response in a di erent condition. However, variance component analysis quanti es phenomena using variances and covariances as well as means. e means of un-decomposed scores (e.g., X ab and X ba in Equations 15.11 and 15.2) are considered, yet the variances and covariances of the components of X (α, β, γ) are of primary interest. Variance component analysis enhances conceptual and statistical precision, and serves a heuristic function by guiding attention to new phenomena and questions.
e theoretical structure of intergroup responses has important methodological implications for research on reconciliation. First, reconciliation will be reciprocal rather than unidirectional. To understand the response of a Hat eld to a McCoy, one must measure the response of H to M and that of M to H. Second, the reconciliation responses of H to M and M to H are each determined by the actor, partner, and uniqueness e ects. Yet, if measurements are limited only to H's response to M and M's response to H, there is insu cient information to estimate the actor, partner, and uniqueness e ects. Multiple, rather than single, interaction designs are required to estimate the reciprocity and componential structure of intergroup relations.
ird, reciprocity is the core mechanism of reconciliation that unfolds temporally. However, two forms of reciprocity must be distinguished for conceptual clarity: generalized and dyadic (Kenny & Nasby, 1980) . Generalized reciprocity is the extent to which a group's consistent responses to multiple other groups are generally reciprocated by them, and is estimated by the correlation of a group's actor and partner e ects. Dyadic reciprocity, however, is limited to speci c pairs of groups and is estimated by the correlation of uniqueness e ects. Correlations representing generalized (actor-partner components) and dyadic (uniqueness-uniqueness components) reciprocity are presented in Figure 15 .2. Unfortunately, the distinction between generalized and dyadic reciprocity has been mostly ignored in research on intergroup relations and reconciliation.
Fourth, modeling intergroup reconciliation begins with a focus on the theoretically relevant components of the IRM constructs and should not be limited to whole, un-decomposed scores. To know clearly if reconciliation is occurring, one should estimate dyadic reciprocity without the confounding e ect of generalized reciprocity.
Power, Reciprocity, and a Reconciliation Attempt
e October 2, 1960 Sunday edition of the New York Times presented a sociogram depicting visits among eight international leaders during a 2 week meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations. International tensions were high, nuclear war was a feared potential, and the Cuban Missile Crisis was yet to materialize. One can assume ethnocentrism, negative stereotypes, and dislike among some leaders although relevant data are unavailable. e data available quantify face to face intergroup contact among the leaders; a construct thought to foster harmony (Pettigrew, 1998) and reconciliation (see Baron, Deutsch, and Kelman, this volume) . e data are presented in a single 8 × 8 round robin matrix (see Malloy & Albright, 2001) in Table 15 .2. Actor, partner, and uniqueness variance components were estimated, as well as individual and dyadic reciprocity. Approximately 24 of the variance in visits was due to di erences among leaders' actor e ects. Following Kenny (1994) , leader i's actor e ect is computed by:
where M i. is the average of visits initiated by leader i, M .i is the average of visits made to leader i, and M .. is the average number of visits among the eight leaders. For leader i, α i. is the actor e ect. Nehru of India was the most active initiator of visits (α = .60) and Eisenhower initiated the least (α = -.71). Partner e ects quantify relative approach by other leaders and for leader i is:
where M .i is the average of visits received by leader i, M i. is the average visits initiated by i, and M .. is the average visits among the leaders. For leader i, β i is the partner e ect. Approximately 22 of the variance was due to di erence among leaders in visits received; Khrushchev was approached the most (β = .83) whereas Macmillan was approached the least (β = -.56).
e di erence between approach and avoidance among leaders is an index of power (Keltner et al., 2003) . For leader i, power (P i ) may be quanti ed by:
where P i is relative power of leader i, and is de ned as the di erence between being approached (β i ) and the initiation of approach (α i ). Positive P values indicate that a leader was approached by others more than he approached them.
Negative P values indicate that a leader approached others more than he was approached by them, and a value of zero for P indicates that approaching and being approached were equal. When P = 0, conditions are prime for reconciliation because approach is equal for the protagonists in a con ict, and the stage is set for a transition from negative to positive reciprocity. As P values depart from zero the likelihood of reconciliation diminishes. Khrushchev had the greatest power (P = 1.13) because he was approached the most (mean of 1.57 visits) and made very few visits to other leaders (mean of .29). Eisenhower was the second most powerful leader (P = .63) with an average of .71 visitors and 0 visits initiated. Nassar, Nehru, and Macmillan were the least powerful (Ps of -.75, -.50, and -.50, respectively). Nassar and Nehru made the greatest number of visits (nine each, with mean visits of 1.29 for each) but their visits were not reciprocated (means of .43 and .71, respectively). Macmillan made ve visits and was visited only once. is analysis of power may seem at odds with other approaches. For example, theoretical analysis predicts that high power should produce approach behavior (Keltner et al., 2003) and empirical data con rm that power leads to action (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003 ). Yet, in di erent contexts di erent norms may moderate the power-action relationship, and these data show that power within the context of strategic international negotiation can lead to inaction. In the case of world leaders, inaction was a public proclamation of high power intended to maintain it and bene t one's in-group constituents. Action was initiated by the less powerful in deference to the more powerful.
Generalized reciprocity was r = -.14 and showed that leaders who initiated visits were not visited by others. Dyadic reciprocity was weak (r = -.28); neither powerful nor weak leaders reciprocated visits. Noteworthy is the nding that both generalized and dyadic reciprocity are negative for the contact variable. Perhaps the negative generalized and dyadic reciprocity, particularly among the most powerful leaders (Khrushchev and Eisenhower had zero contact), precluded the reconciliation that could have curtailed the Cuban Missile crisis.
Summary and Conclusions
Two basic questions for a social psychology of intergroup reconciliation were posed; "what system of variables a ects reciprocal intergroup responses?" and "what variables a ect the transition from intergroup con ict to peaceful coexistence?" In response to the rst, the Intergroup Relations Model speci es cognitive and a ective processes that determine reciprocal group responses under conditions of perceived equality and inequality of opportunity for resource attainment. e prominent role of cognition in human reconciliation stands in contrast to its trivial importance in postcon ict peacemaking among nonhuman primates (de Waal, 2000) . Among humans, a transition from reciprocal con ict to peaceful coexistence hinges on implementation of structural change that ensures equality of opportunity for attaining material (e.g., food, employment, medicine, education) and social (e.g., positive social identity, collective respect, self-determination) resources. Although relations among groups in proximity will almost always be competitive, if competition occurs under equality, peaceful coexistence is possible. As documented in this volume, intergroup reconciliation can be facilitated by equal status contact while confronting a common challenge, by educational interventions, by cognitive reorganization that diminishes sharp intergroup boundaries, and by public pronouncements of wrongdoing with reciprocal apology and forgiveness. However, equality of opportunity is hypothesized to be the major moderator of transition from con ict to peaceful coexistence. Reconciliation will always be slow and unsteady because the requisite structural change is always at odds with the advantage held by powerful groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001 ) that will actively undermine change (Heylighen & Campbell, 1995) . Yet, structural change can be implemented if antagonists realize they are mutually interdependent. For example, when the advantaged and powerful understand the staggering economic and social costs, for the in-group, of institutional racism, the unjust occupation of an adversary, or the disenfranchisement of an ethnic group there can be an incentive to create an equality of opportunity motivated by self-interest. When occupation, racism, and domination are too costly, the transition to equality of opportunity for resource attainment can occur with attendant reconciliation. Intergroup psychology will then be more positive.
ese theoretical ideas have methodological implications. Because intergroup relations are two-sided and reciprocal, it is essential to consider the componential structure of intergroup perception, a ect, and behavior for conceptual clarity and analytic precision. Failure to isolate actor, partner, and uniqueness e ects in intergroup responses precludes assessment of psychologically distinct intergroup phenomena. Intergroup con ict will o en be dyadic with two primary protagonists. Consequently, reconciliation will involve a transition from negative dyadic reciprocity toward positive dyadic reciprocity. Following this, generalized reciprocity will follow. erefore, it is essential to di erentiate generalized and dyadic intergroup phenomena and not con ate them.
